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Abstract. Knowledge Update (respectively Erasure) and Forgetting are two very
different concepts, with very different underlying motivation. Both are tools for
knowledge management; however while the former is meant for accommodating
new knowledge into a knowledge corpus, the latter is meant for modifying – in
fact reducing the expressivity – of the underlying language. In this paper we show
that there is an intimate connection between these two concepts: a particular form
of knowledge update and literal forgetting are inter-definable. This connection is
exploited to enhance both our understanding of update as well as forgetting in
this paper.
Keywords. Knowledge Update, Erasure, Forgetting, Dalal Distance, Winslett
Distance.
Knowledge management involves removal of dated information as well as incorporation
of new information. Relevant literature provides many different approaches to accom-
plishing this tasks, including belief change (revision and contraction) [2,3], knowledge
update (update and erasure) [4], belief merging [5,6] and forgetting (forgetting and re-
membering) [7,8,9]. While these are related but different concepts, there is a crucial
difference between the first three on one hand and forgetting on the other. The former
three manipulate knowledge – they deal with the stuff deemed known; the beliefs. For-
getting on the other hand manipulates the language in which knowledge is expressed.
Consider erasure and forgetting, for instance. We may dramatize the difference between
them as follows: while belief erasure purports to answer the question “What should I
believe if I can no longer support the belief that the cook killed Cock Robin?”, forget-
ting purports to answer the question “What should I believe if Killing was a concept not
afforded in my language?”.4
On the face of it, it would appear that forgetting on the one hand, and belief change
(or update) on the other are completely different concepts, and the relation, if any, be-
tween the language manipulating function forgetting and the belief manipulating func-
tions such as belief change and belief update, would be a tenuous one. The difference
0 This work is an extention of results published in [1]
4 It’s a case of Relational forgetting, of which, literal forgetting that we will largely deal with in
this paper is a special case – propositions are 0-ary relations.
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becomes very explicit from the way these functions are constructed. In a certain sense,
the result of forgetting a primitive relation (including 0-ary relations or atomic sen-
tences) is computed by projecting the original knowledge corpus into a less expressive
language, one in which the relation in question has been eliminated. On the other hand,
the result of discarding a belief is computed by removing the belief in question as well
as a judicious selection of its supporting beliefs – a process for which, an extra-logical
choice mechanism (such as a distance function between the possible worlds or entrench-
ment relation among beliefs) is utilised. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that belief up-
date (respectively erasure) and forgetting, in a qualified way, are inter-translatable. This
paper focuses on this inter-translatability as its central theme, and explores the ways
known results about belief manipulators and language manipulators can compliment
each other.
We initially restrict out attention to belief update and belief erasure, based on Ham-
ming Distance (or Dalal measure) [10] between worlds on the one hand, and literal
forgetting as applied to a finite representation of the knowledge base on the other [9].
Afterwards, we show that the results hold for more general distance measures includ-
ing Winslett measure [11]. We believe this connection will have bearing upon many
interesting related issues, including:
1. In the forgetting literature, the knowledge corpus is primarily represented as a first
order theory. Forgetting in the context of propositional theory is largely of deriva-
tive interest. On the other hand, the literature on belief manipulating functions pri-
marily assumes a propositional language. Given the intertranslatibility between for-
getting and updating (erasure) at propositional level, can we extrapolate an inter-
esting account of first-order knowledge corpus update?
2. Assume that we have an account of first order knowledge base updating. Now, in
the caes of forgetting, we have literal forgetting as well as relational forgetting.
One would naturally try to accordingly extend the account of update to relational
update. Is it meaningful to talk of relational update (erasure)? If, then what sort of
relational update do we get?
3. In case of update, the new information that one wants to accommodate, or the old
information that needs to be discarded, can be any sentence. On the other hand, in
case of forgetting, the stuff to be forgotten is an atomic sentence or a relation. Can
we meaningfully talk of forgetting any arbitrary formula? If so, how should it be
done.
In the next section, we provide the background material. In section 2, we establish
the promised inter-translatability, modulo Dalal distance. In section 3 we show that
such results hold for more general distance measures. Finally we conclude with a short
discussion and summary.
1 Background
Belief manipulation such as updating and erasing, as well as language manipulation
such as forgetting involve representation of an agent’s current stock of beliefs in a spec-
ified language as well as a manipulator operator. In this section we detail crucial parts
of the notation used, as well as how the notions of update, erasure and forgetting are
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formally captured. We adopt a few other conventions that are not explicated here due to
lack of space, but we hope they will be obvious from the context.
1.1 Notation
We shall consider a framework based on a finitary propositional language L, over a set
of atoms, or propositional letters, A = {a, b, c, . . . }, and truth-functional connectives
¬, ∧, ∨, →, and ↔. L also includes the truth-functional constants ⊤ and ⊥. To clarify
the presentation we shall use the following notational conventions. Upper-case Roman
characters (A, B, . . .) denote sets of sentences in L. Lower-case Roman characters
(a, b, . . .) denote arbitrary sentences of L.
An interpretation of L is a function fromA to {T, F}; Ω is the set of interpretations
of L. A model of a sentence x is an interpretation that makes x true, according to the
usual definition of truth. A model can be equated with its defining set of literals, or
alternatively, with the corresponding truth-vector. [x]L′ denotes the set of models of
sentence x over any language L′, while by [x] we will denote [x]L. For interpretation ω
we write ω |= x for x is true in ω. For x ∈ L, we will define L(x), the sub-language of
L in which x is expressed, as comprising the minimum set of atoms required to express
x, as follows, where xpq is the result of substituting atom q everywhere for p in x:
L(x) = {p ∈ A | xp⊤ 6≡ x
p
⊥} ∪ {⊤,⊥}
This set of atoms is unique. Thus L(p ∧ (q ∨ ¬q)) = L(p) = {p,⊤,⊥}. This can be
extended to sets of sentences in the obvious way. It follows trivially that if |= x ↔ y
then L(x) = L(y). Also note that if |= x then L(x) = {⊤,⊥}.
By a theory or belief set we will mean a subset of L that is closed under Cn. We
denote the set of all theories by T . Since L is finitary, any theory T can be repre-
sented by a finite set T ′ ⊆ L such that Cn(T ′) = T , and consequently by a single
sentence
∧
xi∈T ′
xi. Traditionally, in the case of knowledge update, erasure and for-
getting, a belief corpus is represented by a single sentence, where as in accounts of
belief change, knowledge corpus is represented as a theory. Both update and erasures
are defined as functions⊕,⊖ : L × L → L where as forgetting is defined as a function
⊙ : L ×A → L. Thus, for instance, k ⊕ e and k ⊖ e are respectively the sentences
representing the update and erasure of sentence e from the knowledge base represented
by sentence k. On the other hand, k ⊙ a is the theory that results from forgetting atom
a from knowledge k.
1.2 Update and Erasure
Let ≤ω for any world ω be a preorder (reflexive and transitive relation) over Ω that is
faithful with respect to ω, ie., for every ω′ ∈ Ω, we have both ω ≤ω ω′ and if ω′ ≤ω ω
then ω = ω′. If, in addition, either ω′ ≤ω ω′′ or ω′′ ≤ω ω′, for every pair ω′, ω′′, then
it is a total preorder. By ω1 ≤ω ω2 we intuitively mean that ω2 is at least as similar to ω
as ω1 is. As usual, the strict part of≤ω is denoted by <ω This relation compares worlds
with respect to their similarity or proximity to ω. By ω′ ∼ω ω′′ we will denote that ω′
and ω′′ are not comparable under ≤ω; and by ω′ ≡ω ω′′ we will understand that both
ω′ ≤ω ω
′′ and ω′′ ≤ω ω′. Given a set ∆ of worlds, by min≤ ω(∆) we denote the set
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{ω′ ∈ ∆ | ω′′ 6<ω ω
′ for any ω′′ ∈ ∆} of worlds in ∆ that are closest or most similar
to ω.
Definition 1 (Update). [k ⊕ e] = ⋃ω∈[k] min≤ ω([e])
Intuitively, when we learn that e has been effected, with respect to each world allowed
by our current knowledge, we compute what the scenario would be if e was effected in
that world; and collating all those worlds results in the models of our updated knowl-
edge. Obtaining a knowledge base k′ from these models is not difficult.
Definition 2 (from Update to Erasure). The erasure operation is defined by reduction
to update using the Harper Identity. k ⊖ e = k ∨ (k ⊕ ¬e)
Alternatively, Erasure can be directly defined, and update can be defined from erasure
using the Levi Identity.
Definition 3 (Erasure). Erasure can be directly defined as:
[k ⊖ e] = [k] ∪
⋃
ω∈[k] min≤ ω([¬e])
Definition 4 (from Erasure to Update). k ⊕ e = (k ⊖ ¬e) ∧ e
The definitions we have provided of Update and Erasure are constructive. Alternatively
these operations can be defined as those (with appropriate signature) that satisfy the
respective rationality postulates of update and erasure. The postulates can be found in
[4].
It is easily noticed that [k ⊕ e] ⊆ [e], equivalently, k ⊕ e ⊢ e, i.e., a successful
update by a sentence e leads to e being believed. Furthermore, since we assume that a
world closer it itself than any other world, and the worlds in [e] that are ≤ω-minimal
with respect to any world ω in [k] constitute [k ⊕ e], it is clear that [k] ∩ [e] ⊆ [k ⊕ e].
Since [k] = ([k]∩ [e])∪([k]∩ [¬e]), we get the following as an immediate consequence:
Observation 1 [k] ⊆ ([k ⊕ e] ∪ [k ⊕ ¬e]) wherefore k ⊢ (k ⊕ e) ∨ (k ⊕ ¬e).
Now, it follows from Definition 2 that (k ⊖ e) ∨ (k ⊖ ¬e) = k ∨ (k ⊕ e) ∨ (k ⊕ ¬e).
However, as we just noticed, k ⊢ (k ⊕ e) ∨ (k ⊕ ¬e). This leads to:
Observation 2 (k ⊕ e) ∨ (k ⊕ ¬e) ≡ (k ⊖ e) ∨ (k ⊖ ¬e).
We will call (k ⊕ e) ∨ (k ⊕ ¬e) the symmetric update, and (k ⊖ e) ∨ (k ⊖ ¬e) the
symmetric erasure, of k by e. 5 Thus Observation 2 shows the equivalence between
symmetric update and symmetric erasure.
5 Our terminology is somewhat at variance with that used by Katsuno and Mendelzon [4] who
refer to (k ⊕ e) ∨ (k ⊕ ¬e) as the symmetric erasure of e from k, and mention that Winslett,
in an unpublished manuscript, calls it the forgetting of e from k.
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1.3 Literal Forgetting
Forgetting, as we mentioned earlier, is more about language manipulation than about
belief manipulation. While belief erasure (say by e) involves traversing to a judicious
belief state where e is not believed (while allowing the possibility of ¬e still believed),
forgetting of e involves moving to a state where no information regarding e is still
retained. Forgetting has a clear meaning when e in the above case is an atomic sentence
– forgetting of an atom a means moving to a state where neither a nor ¬a is believed.
Hence it is often called literal forgetting.
Let us look at forgetting from an information theoretic point of view. We are con-
sidering the forgetting of atom a from knowledge base k. For an interpretation ω of k,
we will call ω′ the a-dual of ω if it differs from ω exactly on the truth assignment to a.
For instance, if the first bit in ω = 1011 is the assignment to a, then the a-dual of ω is
0011. A belief base k has information regarding atom a just in case [k] contains some
interpretation ω but not its a-dual.
Definition 5 (a-dual closure). Given a set of interpretations ∆ and atomic sentence a,
∆ is closed under a-dual iff the a-dual of every interpretation ω ∈ ∆ is also in ∆.
Clearly, if ∆ is closed under a-dual, then it contains no information regarding atom
a. Furthermore, if ∆ is closed under a-dual for every atom a ∈ A, then ∆ has no
information at all. Since forgetting by a from k is meant to removing all information
pertaining to a from k, it suggests the operation of closing the set of interpretations [k]
under a-dualship. Accordingly we define the dual closure operation
⊎
: 2Ω ×A → 2Ω
as follows:
Definition 6 (dual-closure operation). Given a set of interpretations ∆ ⊆ Ω and
atomic sentence a ∈ A, the dual-closure
⊎
(∆, a) of ∆ under a is the smallest subset
of Ω that includes ∆ and is closed under a-dual. In other words, ⊎(∆, a) = ∆′ ⊆ Ω
such that (1) ∆ ⊆ ∆′, (2) ∆′ is closed under a-dual, and (3) if any ∆′′ such that
∆ ⊆ ∆′′ ⊆ ∆′ is closed under a-dual, then ∆′ = ∆′′.
This definition of
⊎
is non-constructive. It also presumes that
⊎
(∆, a) is unique. Theo-
rem 1 below guides its construction, and justifies the presumption in question. We need
one more definition before producing this result.
Definition 7 (Model Counterparts). For language L ⊆ L, by [S]ΩL we denote the set
of “model counterparts” of S in ΩL. It can be represented as the set of interpretations
ω2 in ΩL that are sub-model of some interpretation or other, ω1 ∈ [S] as: {ω2 ∈
ΩL | ∃ω1∈[S]ω2 ⊆ ω1. Alternatively, it is the set of interpretations in Ω that are super
models of any such model ω2 in ΩL: {ω ∈ Ω | ∃ω1∈[S], ω2∈ΩLω2 ⊆ ω1 and ω1 ⊆ ω}.
Example 1. Consider for example A = {a, b, c}, L = L({b, c}) and S = {a ↔ b}.
Now, [S] = {11⋆, 00⋆}, and its submodels in ΩL are {−⋆⋆} = ΩL.6 Alternatively, the
desired set is {⋆ ⋆ ⋆} = Ω.
6 From here onwards we use ⋆ to indicate atoms with “wild” truth-values, and − to indicate
location of “non-applicable atoms” by a given interpretation.
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Theorem 1. 7 Given a set of interpretations ∆ ⊆ Ω, an atomic sentence a ∈ A and
a sentence d such that [d] = ∆ (a canonical construction of d in DNF8 can be easily
carried out taking the composition of ∆ as a guide), ⊎(∆, a) = [d]ΩL(A\{a}).
We introduced the concept of dual-closure being motivated by an intuitive notion of
literal forgetting. Now we are in a position to offer a semantic definition of literal for-
getting.
Definition 8 (Semantics of literal forgetting). The forgetting operation⊙ : L ×A → L
should be such that [⊙(k, a)] =
⊎
([k], a).
The following example illustrates that this definition captures the semantic intuition
behind forgetting. It also substantiates our generic claim in the introductory note that
forgetting is more about language manipulation than about belief manipulation.
Example 2. LetA = {a, b, c} and k = (a∧¬b)∨c. Thus [k] = {001, 101, 100, 111, 011}.
We tabulate two distinct but equivalent constructions of [⊙(k, a)] in accordance with
the two definitions of [S]ΩL . In some truth vectors ‘−’ is used to indicate the absence
of relevant atoms.
[k] [⊙1(k, a)] [⊙2(k, a)]
001 −01 001
101 101
100 −00 100
000
111 −11 111
011 011
Thus ⊙1(k, a) can be expressed as ¬(b ∧ ¬c) where as ⊙2(k, a) can be expressed
as ¬(a ∧ b ∧ ¬c) ∧ ¬(¬a ∧ b ∧ ¬c). While the latter is expressed in L, the former is
couched in a language devoid of the atom a. Nonetheless, both are equivalent, and are
equivalent to (b→ c) as expected.
Now that the semantics of forgetting is in place, we consider its syntactic characterisa-
tion. For this purpose, we borrow the definition of forgetting from [9].
Definition 9 (Syntactic representation of literal forgetting). For any formula x and
atom a, denote by x|1←a the result of replacing every occurrence of a in x by ⊤, and
by x|0←a the result of replacing every occurrence of a in x by ⊥. Forgetting an atom a
from a knowledge base represented as sentence k is defined as: k ⊙a = k|1←a∨k|0←a.
Continuing with the Example 2, we find that ⊙((a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c, a) ≡ ((⊤∧¬b) ∨ c) ∨
((⊥∧ ¬b) ∨ c) ≡ ¬b ∨ c ≡ (b→ c) matching the result from semantic analysis. The
following result shows that this match is not due to a lucky choice of example.
7 Proofs of results provided in this paper can be obtained from the first named author upon
request.
8 A formula in Disjunctive Normal Form is a disjunction of conjunctive clauses, where a con-
junctive clause is a conjunction of literals.
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Theorem 2. For any sentence k ∈ L, atom a ∈ A and world ω ∈ Ω, it holds that
ω ∈ [⊙(k, a)] (as defined in Definition 9) if and only if ω ∈ ⊎([k], a).
The Definition 9 also makes it clear that ⊕ is very syntax-sensitive. Consider for in-
stance four knowledge bases that are equivalent when conjunctively interpreted: B1 =
{a, b}, B2 = {a ∧ b}, B3 = {a → b, a ∨ b}, and B4 = {a, ¬a ∨ b}, and we
are to forget a. If we were to understand forgetting from a set as piece-wise forgetting
from the member-formulas in the set, then we get as result: B′1 = {⊤, b}, B′2 = {b},
B′3 = {⊤} and B′4 = {⊤}. This explains why we represent the knowledge base as
a single sentence. If, however, piece-meal processing is desirable, it can be done by
representing the knowledge base as a set of conjunction of literals, disjunctively inter-
preted (corresponding to DNF), and process the set-members individually. This would
closely correspond the semantic account given in Example 2. In contrast, if a base is
represented as a set of clauses, it will give the wrong result, as in the case of B4 above.
2 Update, Erasure and Forgetting – Dalal connection
We have noticed that update and erasure are belief manipulating operations whereas
forgetting is a language manipulating operation. Nonetheless, it is clear that both in
case of erasure and forgetting, beliefs are lost. We now explore whether, and if so, how
they can be inter-defined.
The first obstacle to this is the fact that where as in case of erasure, a particular
relational measure is assumed to exist over Ω, no such measure is assumed in case
of forgetting. Inter-translatability between these two concepts therefore will therefore
push us to either impose such a external measure on Γ and accordingly generalize the
definition of forgetting, or restrict us to measures on Γ that are implicitly given by the
knowledge base k itself and look at more restricted forms of erasure. Lang and Marqis
[7] choose the former option. In this paper we choose the latter. This brings us to specific
approaches to erasure (and updating) – in particular one based on Hamming Distance –
between interpretations.
2.1 A Concrete Update Operator via Hamming-Distance
Belief update operators presume a preorder over interpretations, as do belief revision
operators. Two such classes preorders have drawn much attention from the researchers
in the area, one based on the Hamming Distance between the sets of literals representing
two interpretations, and the other based on the symmetric difference between them. The
former was introduced for belief update by Forbus [12], and by Dalal [10] for belief
revision. On the other hand, Winslett [11] introduced the latter for belief update, and
Satoh [13] for belief revision. Here we restrict our attention to updates only, and that
too based on Hamming Distance. As popularly called in the area, refer to Hamming
distance as “Dalal Distance”.
Definition 10 (Dalal Distance). Given ω, ω′ ∈ ΩL for some language L, the Dalal
Distance distD(ω, ω′) between ω and ω′ is the number of atoms that they assign dif-
ferent values: distD(ω, ω′) = |{a ∈ Atoms(L) | ω |= a iff ω′ ⊢ ¬a}|.
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Thus, distD(101, 001) = 1, distD(101, 011) = 2, and distD(101, 110) = 2.
Definition 11 (Dalal Preorder ≤D). Given three interpretations ω, ω′ and ω′′ ∈ ΩL
for some language L, ω′ ≤Dω ω′′ iff distD(ω, ω′) ≤ distD(ω, ω′′).
Thus, we get 001 <D101 011, 001 <D101 110, and 011 ≡D101 110 . It is easily verified
that Given a language L and a world ω ∈ ΩL, the Dalal Preorder ≤Dω is a faithful,
total preorder over ΩL. The definitions of update and erasure we provided earlier (see
Definitions 1 – 4) directly or indirectly employ a preorder. We can thus obtain specific
update and erasure operators simply by plugging in Dalal and Winslett preorders.
Definition 12 (Dalal Update and Dalal Erasure). By ⊕D and ⊖D we will denote the
Dalal Update and Erase operations obtained by plugging in the Dalal Preorder in the
definitions of Update and Erasure provided in Definitions 1 and 2 (or alternatively in
Definitions 3 and 4).
Example 3. Let A = {a, b, c} and k = (a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c as in Example 2. Thus [k] =
{001, 101, 100, 111, 011} and [a] = {100, 101, 110, 111}. We consider updates and
erasures of k by a. We need to compute
⋃
ω∈[k] min≤ω([a]) for update and⋃
ω∈[k] min≤ω([¬a]) for erasure with respect to ≤D. Since ≤D is faithful, for any
sentence e,
⋃
ω∈[k]
min≤ω([e]) = ([k] ∩ [e]) ∪
⋃
ω∈[k]\[e])
min≤ω([e]).
In the table below, the first two columns give the ≤ω-ordering of [a] for ω ∈ ([k] \ [a]),
and the last three columns give the ≤ω-ordering of [¬a] for ω ∈ ([k] \ [¬a]). The
comma’s are to be interpreted as≡D. The minimal elements of interest are in bold face.
[a]≤
D
001 [a]≤
D
011 [¬a]≤
D
100 [¬a]≤
D
101 [¬a]≤
D
111
110 100 011 010 000
100, 111 101, 110 001, 010 000, 011 001, 010
101 111 000 001 011
Accordingly we get:
[k ⊕D a] = {100, 101, 111} and [k ⊖D a] = {001, 011, 100, 101, 111, 000},
whereby, (k ⊕D a) ≡ a ∧ (b → c) and (k ⊖D a) ≡ b → c. Furthermore, using
Definitions 2 and 4 (or going through semantics again) we can also show that (k ⊕D
¬a) ≡ ¬a ∧ (b→ c) and (k ⊖D ¬a) ≡ (a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c ≡ k.
2.2 Updating, Erasing and Forgetting – Literally
We discussed updating and erasing with Dalal and Winslett preorders so that these ac-
counts of belief manipulation and the account of language manipulation via forgetting
are on the same footing, with the hope that we can easily explore the connection be-
tween them. Since the account of forgetting involves forgetting of literals, we will also
assume in this section that the update and erase in question are those by literals. Hence
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it is prudent to start with exploring the connection between them, and later on to convert
that connection with respect to updates.
Now, both forgetting and erase are operations that remove information. In fact, while
erase removes some information involving the sentence a, forgetting removes all infor-
mation regarding the atom a – it semantically removes a itself. Hence it would appear
that perhaps forgetting of a would involve erasure of both a and ¬a. The following re-
sult shows that it indeed is the case – forgetting of atom a indeed results in that part of
the knowledge that is left untouched by both erasure of a and erasure of ¬a under Dalal
Preorder!
Theorem 3 (Dalal Erasure to Forget). Given k a knowledge base, k ⊙ a ≡ (k ⊖D
a) ∨ (k ⊖D ¬a) for every atom a.
Appealing to Observation 2 and Theorems 3, we right away obtain:
Corollary 1 (Dalal Update to Forget). k ⊙ a ≡ (k ⊕D a) ∨ (k ⊕D ¬a) for any
knowledge base k and any atom a.
Putting the results Theorems 3 and Corollary 1 we obtain:
Theorem 4 (Dalal Update/Erasure to Forget). For any knowledge base k and any
atom a, the formula k ⊙ a is equivalent to each of the following two formulas:
1. (k ⊕D a) ∨ (k ⊕D ¬a)
2. (k ⊖D a) ∨ (k ⊖D ¬a)
Theorem 4 shows that forgetting of a knowledge base k by atom a can be identified,
individually, with both the symmetric update and the symmetric erasure of k by a where
the update and erasure operations in question are based on Dalal preorder. The following
example illustrates this result.
Example 4. Let’s revisit Example 3. We know that
1. (k ⊕D a) ≡ a ∧ (b→ c)
2. (k ⊖D a) ≡ b→ c.
3. (k ⊕D ¬a) ≡ ¬a ∧ (b→ c).
4. (k ⊖D ¬a) ≡ (a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c.
Plugging in these values, we get
– (k ⊕D a) ∨ (k ⊕D ¬a) ≡
(a ∧ (b→ c)) ∨ (¬a ∧ (b→ c)) ≡ b→ c.
– (k ⊖D a) ∨ (k ⊖D ¬a) ≡
(b→ c) ∨ ((a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c) ≡ b→ c.
Thus in either case the value obtained for k ⊙ a, reduced to ⊕D or ⊖D, is b → c ,
matching the value of k ⊙ a independently obtained in Example 2.
Now that we know how Literal Forgetting can be reduced to update (or erase) of a
special nature, we consider the question whether the reduction can be done in the re-
verse direction. Theorem 5 below shows that Dalal literal updates can be defined via
forgetting. The similarity between this result, and the definition of updating via erasure
(Definition 4) is rather striking.
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Theorem 5 (Forget to Update). Given any knowledge base k and any atom a, the
following equivalences hold:
1. (k ⊕D a) ≡ (k ⊙ a) ∧ a
2. (k ⊕D ¬a) ¬a) ≡ (k ⊙ a) ∧ ¬a
This result shows how the update of a knowledge base by a literal, modulo Dalal pre-
order, can be computed purely by syntactic manipulation in an efficient manner. Syntac-
tic characterisation of most belief update and belief revision operators have been done
by del Val [14,15]. del Val’s approach assumes conversion of the relevant portion of the
knowledge base k, and the evidence e into DNF. However, as pointed out by Delgrande
and Schaub [16], this may require exponential time step and exponential space. Clearly
update and erasure operations via forgetting are a lot more frugal.
Applying Definition 2, that k ⊖ e = k ∨ (k ⊕ ¬e), to the definition of updates in
Theorem 5, and noting that [k] ⊆ [k⊙a], we reduce Dalal erasure to forgetting as well:
Theorem 6 (Forget to Erase). Given any knowledge base k and any atom a, the fol-
lowing equivalences hold:
1. (k ⊖D a) ≡ (k ⊙ a) ∧ (a→ k)
2. (k ⊖D ¬a) ≡ (k ⊙ a) ∧ (¬a→ k)
In Example 5 below we complete the circle in the sense that the results of updates and
erasures computed in accordance with Theorems 5 and 6 are shown to match to those
independently computed in Example 3.
Example 5. We know from Example 2 that (k ⊙ a) ≡ (b → c). Applying Theo-
rems 5 and 6 we get
1. (k ⊕D a) ≡ (b→ c) ∧ a
2. (k ⊕D ¬a) ≡ (b→ c) ∧ ¬a
3. (k ⊖D a)
≡ (b→ c) ∧ a→ ((a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c)
≡ (b→ c) ∧ (a→ (b→ c)) ≡ (b→ c).
4. (k ⊖D ¬a)
≡ (b→ c) ∧ ¬a→ ((a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c)
≡ (b→ c) ∧ ((a ∧ ¬b) ∨ (a ∨ c))
≡ (b→ c) ∧ (a ∨ c) ≡ (a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c).
matching the values of updates and erasures independently computed in the Example 3.
3 Other Connections
Now that we have seen the connection between Dalal erasure and forgetting, let’s see
whether there is any connection between forgetting and Winslett erasure [11]. As we
will see, the connection is no less interesting.
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Definition 13 (Winslett Distance). 9 Given two interpretations ω, ω′ ∈ ΩL for
some language L, the Winslett Distance distW (ω, ω′) between ω and ω′ is the set
of atoms that they assign different values: distW (ω, ω′) = {a ∈ Atoms(L) | ω |=
a iff ω′ ⊢ ¬a}. It may be taken to be the symmetric difference between Literals(ω) and
Literals(ω′) as well.
Definition 14 (Winslett Preorder). Given three interpretations ω, ω′ and ω′′ ∈ ΩL
for some language L, ω′ ≤Wω ω′′ iff distW (ω, ω′) ⊆ distW (ω, ω′′).
As a prelude, we prove the following lemma concerning Winslett distance which claims
that if a world ω has an a-dual in ω′ in [a], then ω′ must be ≤Wω -minimal in [a].
Lemma 1 (a-dual and≤W -minimality for literals). Given three interpretations ω, ω′ and ω′′
such that ω′, ω′′ ∈ [a] for some atom a, if ω′ is the a-dual of ω, then ω′ ≤Wω ω′′.
Proof Sketch: The proof is guided by the following intuition. Since ω′ ∈ [a] and
and is an a-dual of ω, clearly ω assigns 0 to a, and every world in [a] assigns 1 to a.
Thus, {a,¬a} ⊆ DistW (ω, ω′′) for every ω′′ ∈ [a]. On the other hand, since ω′ is the
a-dual of ω, clearly DistW (ω, ω′) = {a,¬a}. Thus, ω′ ≤Wω ω′′.
This lemma effectively implies that, given a world ω and an atom [a], the set of ≤ω-
minimal worlds in [a] under the preorders ≤D and ≤W are same. In other words, as
long as the input formula is an atom, update and erasure as insensitive to the difference
between Dalal distance and Winslett distance. Hence we get:
Theorem 7 (Winslett Measure and Forget). The inter-translation between forget and
update, and between forget and erasure discussed so far (Theorems 3 – 4) holds if we
use Winslett Measure instead of Dalal Measure in order to generate the preorders over
the worlds.
Proof Sketch: We know how update, erasure and literal forgetting are inter-definable
given that the underlying measure is the Dalal measure. By Lemma 1, in case of atomic
input formula, the difference between dalal measure and Winslett measure vanishes as
far as update and erasure behaviour is concerned. Hence, it follows that forget, update
and erasure can be analogously interdefined in the context of Winslett measure.
Theorem 8 (A more general result). Literal forgetting operation ⊙ and literal updat-
ing operation ⊕ (resp. erasure mutatis mutandis) are interdefinable as
1. (k ⊙ a) = (k ⊕ a) ∨ (k ⊕ ¬a), and
2. (k ⊕ a) = (k ⊙ a) ∧ a
if and only if the operation ⊕ is generated by preorder family ≤ that is faithful, and
ω′ <ω ω
′′ given any atom a′ and interpretations ω′, ω′′ ∈ [a′] such that ω′ is the
a′-dual of ω but ω′′ is not.
9 Strictly speaking Winslett Distance not a distance, not even a pseudo distance. We use the
term “distance” here in a very loose sense.
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Proof Sketch:
RIGHT TO LEFT (⇐) Assume that the preorder family ≤ has the required property
Since the preorders are faithful, clearly if ω ∈ [k]∩ [a] then ω ∈ min(≤ω). On the
other hand, if ω ∈ [k] \ [a] then min(≤ω) = {ω′} where ω′ is the a-dual of ω.
Thus [k ⊕ ≤a] equates
([k] ∩ [a]) ∪
⋃
ω∈[k]∩[¬a]
{ω′ ∈ [a] | ω′ is the a-dual of ω}.
Similarly, [k ⊕ ≤¬a] is
([k] ∩ [¬a]) ∪
⋃
ω∈[k]∩[a]
{ω′ ∈ [¬a] | ω′ is the a-dual of ω}.
Thus together we get, ([k ⊕ ≤a] ∪ [k ⊕ ≤¬a]) =
([k] ∪
⋃
ω∈[k]
{ω′ | ω′ is the a-dual of ω} =
⊎
(k, a)
leading to the desired result.
LEFT TO RIGHT (⇒) Assume that the preorder family ≤ is either
1. not faithful, i.e. there exist ω 6= ω′ such that either
(a) ω′ ≤ω ω, or
(b) ω ∼ω ω′
or
2. there exist ω ∈ Ω, atom a′ and ω′, ω′′ ∈ [a′] such that
(a) ω′ is the a′-dual of ω,
(b) ω′′ is not the a′-dual of ω, and
(c) ω′ 6<ω ω′′.
Case 1 Arbitrarily pick ω 6= ω′ such that either ω′ ≤ω ω, or ω ∼ω ω′. Let sentence
k be the sentential representation of ω. Also, wlg, pick atom a such that ω, ω′ ∈
[a]. Note that
⊎
(k, a) should consist of two interpretations, namely ω and the
a-dual of ω. Clearly, either {ω} ⊂ {ω′′ ∈ [a] | ω′′ is ≤ω -minimal in [a]} or
ω 6∈ {ω′′ ∈ [a] | ω′′ is ≤ω -minimal in [a]}. In other words, [k⊕≤ a] 6= {ω}.
Now consider [k ⊕≤ ¬a] = {ω′′ | ω′′ is ≤ω -minimal in [¬a]}. Clearly
ω 6∈ [k ⊕≤ ¬a] 6= ∅. Furthermore, [k ⊕≤ a] ∩ [k ⊕≤ ¬a] = ∅.
Hence the set [k⊕≤ a] ∪ [k⊕≤¬a] either does not have ω as a member, or has
at least three members. In either case, this set would be different from
⊎
(k, a).
Case 2 Pick ω, ω′, ω′′ and atom a′ of the appropriate nature. Set a = a′. Clealy
ω 6∈ [a]. It is easily verified that either ω′ is not ≤ω -minimal in [a] or there are
at least two elements that are≤ω -minimal in [a]. Now, arguing analogously as
in (Case 1) we can show that the set [k ⊕≤ a] ∪ [k ⊕≤ ¬a] either does not
have ω′, the adual of a, as a member, or has at least three members, and hence
is not identical with
⊎
(k, a).
This completes the proof.
Forgetting and Update 13
How general is the General Result?
One might wonder whether this result buys us anything at all! A case at hand to consider
is the preorder generated by the polular distance measures drastic distance:
DistDr(ω, ω
′) =
{
0 if ω = ω′
1 other wise
Though faithful, this measure does not satisfy the other attendant condition. So update
based on drastic distance cannot be defined in the manner described. This is demon-
strated by the following ecample.
Example 6. Assume, as in Example 2 and 3, that A = {a, b, c} and k = (a∧¬b)∨ c.
Thus [k] = {001, 101, 100, 111, 011} and [a] = {100, 101, 110, 111}. We consider
drastic update and drastic erasure of k by a. We need to compute
⋃
ω∈[k] min≤Drω([a])
for update and
⋃
ω∈[k] min≤Drω([¬a]) for erasure. It is easily verified that for any ω =
0 ⋆ ⋆, min≤Drω([a]) = [a] and for any ω = 1 ⋆ ⋆, min≤Drω([¬a]) = [¬a].
Accordingly we get
1. (k ⊕Dr a) ≡ a and
2. (k ⊖Dr a) ≡ k ∨ ¬a ≡ (a→ c), where as
3. (k ⊕ a) ≡ (k ⊙ a) ∧ a ≡ a ∧ (b→ c) and
4. (k ⊖ a) ≡ (k ⊙ a) ∧ a→ k ≡ (b→ c).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we started with intention of showing that belief-manipulation mechanisms
such as updating and language manipulation mechanisms like forgetting are intercon-
nected. In Section 1, after introducing the notation, we provided the background infor-
mation on both knowledge update and erasure, restricted to Dalal measure. In the next
section we showed how update and erasure, given Dalal measure and a literal input on
the one hand, and forgetting on the other, are inter-definable.
In section 3 we extended these results to more more general measures such as
Winslett measure. we also showed that there are popular measures such as Drastic dis-
tance do not yeild to such easy definition of forgetting.
It is debatable if interesting accounts of forgetting, where the input is an arbitrary
sentence, can be given based on the interconnections provided here. On the face of
it, forgetting of an arbitrary formula does not make sense, since it would correspond
to removal of a set of atoms from the language. We however prefer to leave it as an
unresolved issue at this point. Furthermore, first order belief update, a topic of much
interest, is also left to be addressed in future.
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